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The Twenty-First Century Poll Tax 
by RYAN A. PARTELOW* 
Introduction 
In 2008, Randi Lynn Williams of Dothan, Alabama, lost her right to 
vote when she was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card.1  Although 
she served her sentence of probation and a few months in prison, she is still 
currently unable to vote.2  Although many states have abolished or 
liberalized their laws disenfranchising convicted felons in recent years,3 in 
Alabama and many other states, individuals convicted of a felony cannot 
regain their voting rights until they pay off the financial obligations resulting 
from their conviction.4  These financial obligatiwons can include outstanding 
court fines, legal fees, and victim restitution.5  These laws have left otherwise 
eligible voters, including Ms. Williams, unable to participate in the 
democratic process because they owe a monetary debt to the state.6 
Although disenfranchising voters over outstanding legal financial 
obligations (“LFOs”) is widely criticized, no court has yet been persuaded to 
strike down these laws.  The practice continues to disenfranchise people 
based on wealth, and disproportionately affects the voting rights of people 
of color due to inherent racial disparities in socioeconomic status and the 
 
        *   Associate, Covington & Burling LLP. J.D., 2019, Fordham University School of Law; 
B.A., 2012, American University School of Public Affairs. I would like to thank Professor Tracy 
Higgins and Julia MacAllister for their helpful criticism and guidance, the editorial staff of the 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their assistance, and my wife, Emily Falcone, for her 
patience, love, and support. 
 1.  Connor Sheets, Too Poor to Vote: How Alabama’s ‘New Poll Tax’ Bars Thousands of 
People From Voting, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ 
oct/04/alabama-voting-poll-tax. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Samantha J. Gross, Florida Voters Approve Amendment 4 on Restoring Felons’ Voting 
Rights, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/ 
election/article220678880.html. 
 4.  ALLYSON FREDERICKSEN & LINNEA LASSITER, ALL. FOR A JUST SOC’Y, 
DISENFRANCHISED BY DEBT: MILLIONS IMPOVERISHED BY PRISON, BLOCKED FROM VOTING 5 
(2016). 
 5.  Erika L. Wood & Neema Trivedi, The Modern Day Poll Tax: How Economic Sanctions 
Block Access to the Polls, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 30, 36–38 (2007). 
 6.  Sheets, supra note 1. 
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American criminal justice system.  LFO disenfranchisement calls to mind 
the poll taxes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which were 
prohibited in federal elections by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and in 
state elections by the landmark Supreme Court case Harper v. Virginia State 
Board of Elections.7  Although the concept of felon disenfranchisement itself 
has been affirmatively upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court,8 this Article 
argues that disenfranchisement for outstanding LFOs is more akin to the poll 
tax jurisprudence than to the felon-voting cases.  This Article aims to add to 
a growing body of literature criticizing these practices by providing an 
extensive examination of the constitutional doctrines and legislative history 
of both the practice of LFO disenfranchisement as well as the possibly 
implicated constitutional provisions.  This Article ultimately argues that 
LFO disenfranchisement schemes violate both the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and 
rendering a necessary change in the way courts should view this issue. 
Part I discusses the history and background of the poll tax and the long 
struggle that resulted in its abolishment under both a constitutional 
amendment and landmark Supreme Court case.  Part II describes the history 
and legal doctrines surrounding felon disenfranchisement in the United 
States.  Part III discusses LFO disenfranchisement and its current treatment 
by courts.  Finally, Part IV analyzes LFO disenfranchisement in light of the 
relevant case law, history, and constitutional text, and concludes that courts 
have incorrectly analyzed these restrictions as they violate both the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 
I. The Poll Tax and the Long Struggle to Enfranchise the Poor 
The prohibition against poll taxes is part of the written constitution of 
the United States as well as the larger constitutional canon.  The view that 
the poll tax is antithetical to American democracy, however, was far from 
self-evident and resulted from a transformative change in the American 
constitutional fabric during the New Deal Era and Civil Rights Movement.  
Part I.A. addresses the early history and use of the poll tax in America.  Part 
I.B. addresses the legislative history and jurisprudence surrounding the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment.  Part I.C. discusses the post-Amendment 
treatment of the poll tax and the Supreme Court’s monumental decision in 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,9 which finally, and 
determinatively, prohibited the poll tax in America. 
 
 7.  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 8.  See infra Part II.B. 
 9.  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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A. From a Bridge to a Barrier10 
A poll tax, also called a head tax, is a direct tax levied on all adults11 
which in the United States has been strongly connected to voting rights.12  In 
the popular imagination, the poll tax is notoriously connected with 
suppressing black voters in the Jim Crow South, and while this is true in 
some ways, the history of the tax and its connection with the vote is not as 
simple as that. 
Ironically, the poll tax requirement for casting a ballot in the United 
States was originally employed as a means of expanding, rather than 
limiting, the franchise.  Following the American Revolution, many states 
allowed only property owners to vote; the idea being that owning property 
showed an investment in the welfare of the community beyond simply living 
in it.13  As a more liberal measure, some states, including Pennsylvania, 
Georgia, and South Carolina,14 opted to impose a small tax to substitute for 
these property qualifications.15  The tax requirement, although still a means 
of keeping certain individuals from voting, originally served to expand 
voting rights from only white male property owners to those white men who 
could afford to pay the tax.16  As the national economy changed and attitudes 
about voting gradually liberalized at the state level, with nearly all states 
eventually granting universal white male suffrage, these taxes were all but 
eliminated as a prerequisite for voting by the mid-nineteenth century.17 
However, after the end of the Civil War and the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, the poll tax requirement experienced a 
dramatic resurgence in the South.18  Following the collapse of 
 
 10.  See Fagan Dickinson, The Poll Tax and Voter Registration, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1038 
(1957) (“Ironically, the poll tax, which was originally adopted to extend suffrage, is now sometimes 
supported as a means of limiting the voting privilege to the ‘better class of people.’”). 
 11.  For an extensive history of the use of these taxes in the Ancient World, England, and 
colonial-era America, see generally, David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINN. L. REV. 375, 378–82 (2011). 
 12.  BRIAN L. FIFE, REFORMING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN AMERICA: TOWARD MORE 
DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (Praeger, 2010). 
 13.  Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote, 86 DENV. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2009); Schultz & 
Clark, supra note 11, at 382. 
 14.  In many Southern states, white men were “increasingly accumulating wealth, even though 
it was not in terms of real property, and demanding the vote.”  Ellis, supra note 13, at 1039. 
 15.  FIFE, supra note 12, at 19; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: 
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 63 
(Yale Univ. Press, 1974); Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 382. 
 16.  See Ellis, supra note 13, at 1037. 
 17.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 385 (“By the time of Andrew Jackson’s Presidential 
inauguration in 1829, only two states continued to require a freeholder status for voting.”); see also, 
id. at 386 (noting that the poll tax’s “adoption was a democratic reform, and its rejection the same”). 
 18.  This post-Reconstruction tax requirement is particularly ironic as some states, such as 
Alabama, first entered the Union in the antebellum period without any tax or property qualifications 
whatsoever.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 385. 
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Reconstruction, where the voting protections for newly freed black citizens 
were vigorously enforced by the federal government, state governments used 
their newfound control to actively stop these newly enfranchised voters from 
casting ballots, and made various efforts to effectively re-subjugate these 
individuals to their enslaved status.19  After periods marked by state-
sanctioned violence and intimidation, the southern state governments sought 
to disenfranchise black voters by more traditional legal means, beginning in 
the 1870s and culminating in the state constitutional conventions of the 
1890s and 1900s.20  One part of this myriad of efforts was a renewed push 
for a poll tax payment as a precondition for voting.  These efforts were 
initially successfully opposed by poorer white people, who feared the 
requirement would also force them to surrender their ability to vote.21  
Despite this resistance, every State in the former Confederacy had enacted a 
poll tax statute by 1904.22 
The renewed poll tax was only one means of suppressing the black vote 
in the South, along with other restrictions like literacy tests and grandfather 
clauses, and electoral practices such as the white primary.23  Southern 
states also continued to use extralegal means, such as violence, lynching, 
threats, and intimidation, to keep the black population from voting.24  
Although it is impossible to estimate just how many individuals were 
disenfranchised specifically as a result of the poll tax, due to the 
confluence of these other similar restrictions,25 there is a consensus 
among scholars that the poll tax certainly kept at least some otherwise 
eligible voters from casting their ballots.26 
Although the explicit purpose of the poll tax requirement was to 
disenfranchise the black vote, it is important to address the class politics that 
 
 19.  For a detailed explanation of ways that state governments rolled back the progress of 
Reconstruction and subjugated black citizens, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First 
Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 27–43 (Chandler 
Davidson ed., 1984). 
 20.  See Burton D. Wechsler, Black and White Disenfranchisement: Populism, Race, and 
Class, 52 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 23, 30-34 (2002). 
 21.  ELEANOR BONTECOU, THE POLL TAX 10 (1942). 
 22.  KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 63. 
 23.  See Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 386; see generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Oxford University Press, 3d rev. ed. 1974). 
 24.  R. GRANN LLOYD, WHITE SUPREMACY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1952); see Chandler 
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 10 
(Bernard Goffman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); see generally, WOODWARD, supra note 23. 
 25.  V.O. KEY JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS 599 (1949) (“The assignment of a weight to one of 
these influences—the poll tax—is somewhat like trying to decide what proportion of the score of a 
football team can be attributed to the efforts of any one player.”); see also, John Lackey, The Poll 
Tax: Its Impact on Racial Suffrage, 54 KY. L.J. 423, 427 (1965) (“Apparently, the Mississippi 
Department of Revenue is quite willing for [a black person] to pay his poll tax; there were other 
effective ways to keep him from voting.”). 
 26.  See KEY, supra note 25, at 599. 
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motivated the requirement as well.  After the end of Reconstruction and the 
withdrawal of federal troops, the Democratic Party, which at that time was 
made up of many former Confederate leaders and wealthy white landowners, 
once again dominated southern legislatures.27  The Democratic elite sought 
to once again unite white southerners in the face of what they viewed as 
tyranny and illegitimate rule by northern Republican carpetbaggers.28  Many 
of the policies advanced by these legislatures to expand the South’s industrial 
and financial standing and modernize the southern economy, however, ran 
counter to the economic interests of poor white farmers.29  These poor 
farmers eventually split from the Democratic Party to join the People’s Party 
(the Populists), an insurgent political movement motivated by increasing 
anxiety among the nation’s farmers over the declining position of small, 
independently owned farms and the rise of wage labor.30  Interestingly, the 
Populists (and, ironically, even the Democrats of this era)31 often relied on 
black voters for assistance at the polls,32 despite many leaders of the 
movement exhibiting openly xenophobic and racist views.33  While 
outwardly in favor of disenfranchising black voters, many of these poorer 
whites fought Democratic disenfranchisement efforts due to fears that they 
too would lose their political power and voting rights, and would thus forfeit 
their economic interests.34 
 
 27.  See Nate Cohn, Demise of the Southern Democrat Is Now Nearly Complete, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/upshot/demise-of-the-southern-democrat-is-
now-nearly-compete.html; Blain Roberts & Ethan J. Kytle, When the South Was the Most 
Progressive Region in America, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com 
/politics/archive/2018/01/when-the-south-was-the-most-progressive-region-in-america/550442/. 
 28.  KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 26 (“Everywhere the ruling oligarchy stressed the threat of 
[black] domination and of a return to Reconstruction and the consequent necessity of solid support 
for the ‘white man’s party.’”); see also, id. at 11–17.  
 29.  BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 11 (“The new leaders of the [Democratic] party, however, 
proved to be interested primarily in the industrial and financial expansion of the South.”); 
KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 17 (“As upper-class Redeemers cut back government expenditures, 
absconded with a good deal of the budgeted public money, prevented mountain whites from 
electing their own local officials, and instituted policies strikingly favorable to big Northern-owned 
businesses, many whites began to doubt the virtues of Redemption.”). 
 30.  KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 33-34; Joseph Gerteis & Alyssa Goolsby, Nationalism in 
America: The Case of the Populist Movement, 34 THEORY AND SOCIETY 197, 205–06 (2005).  See 
generally, JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND 
THE PEOPLE’S PARTY (1931). 
 31.  Wechsler, supra note 20, at 28 (noting the “striking contradiction” of the Democrats 
“being the sworn party of white supremacy, while simultaneously courting the black vote”). 
 32.  See KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 35–37; Lackey, supra note 25, at 424. 
 33.  Gerteis & Goolsby, supra note 30, at 205 (“[D]espite the largely sincere attempt to build 
a political coalition of black and white members, most Southern white Populists remained avowed 
racists.”). 
 34.  Id. 
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After the national People’s Party supported the populist Democratic 
Senator William Jennings Bryan’s presidential campaign in 1896,35 the 
People’s Party lost nearly all of its electoral clout, and the Democrats once 
again dominated southern legislatures.36  To keep their grip on power, and 
despite large protests from poorer and formerly Populist-led counties, many 
of the remaining states approved new poll taxes in rapid succession.37  While 
the state constitutional conventions of this era were explicit about their 
intention to disenfranchise black voters38 without disenfranchising any white 
voters, many of these conventions’ debate records show a willingness to 
purge formerly Populist white voters as well.39  Both black voters and lower-
class white voters, who had seen their political power and franchise rights 
expanded during the years of Populist challenge to the one-party South, 
became a prime target for disenfranchisement once the People’s Party all but 
collapsed.40  In the fifteen-year period between 1889 and 1904, the former 
Confederate states, now firmly dominated by the Democrats, wrote a number 
of statutes and constitutional provisions designed to keep these voters from 
the polls, and one of the chief means of doing so was the new poll tax 
requirement for voting.41 
Indeed, even while the poll tax requirement was specifically aimed at 
black voters, and generally at all low-income voters, it had the effect of 
disproportionately affecting black voters.42 As Senator Paul Douglas of 
Illinois later explained, the poll-tax requirement “was intended to reduce the 
number of low-income citizens who could vote.  It disenfranchised poor 
whites as well as poor [black people].  But since the [black people] were on 
the average much poorer than the whites, it disenfranchised more [black 
 
 35.  Although Bryan championed the economic interests of the poorer whites most associated 
with populism, throughout his life he held racist views toward African Americans.  See HICKS, 
supra note 30, at 354–79 (describing the contentious internal debates within the Populist movement 
regarding support of Bryan’s campaign); see also, Willard H. Smith, William Jennings Bryan and 
Racism, 54 J. NEGRO HISTORY 127, 136 (1969) (“[Bryan’s] attitude toward [black/white] race 
relations, however, was much less generous and was quite inconsistent with his emphasis on 
democracy, equality, and rule by the people.”). 
 36.  Lackey, supra note 25, at 424. 
 37.  See Franklin B. Williams Jr., The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement in the South, 1870-
1901, 18 J. SOUTHERN HISTORY 469, 471 (1952). 
 38.  See, e.g., ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT 17 (2015) (noting one delegate discussing 
the poll tax provision as a means of both raising education funding and disenfranchising black 
voters, who he described as “a vicious and useless class”). 
 39.  KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 250–57.  In Alabama’s convention, for example, there is 
direct testimony that the cumulative tax provision was meant to disenfranchise many poor whites 
who would vote against the economic interests of the wealthy Southern Democratic elite.  See id at 
169; see also, Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1036. 
 40.  Wechsler, supra note 20, at 29. 
 41.  See KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 169–81. 
 42.  See Lackey, supra note 25, at 427. 
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people] than whites.”43  As a means of racially targeted disenfranchisement, 
the poll tax was incredibly effective.  As an illustrative example: in 
Louisiana, there were 130,000 black voters registered in 1896 before the poll 
tax requirement was enacted, but only 1,340 remained in 1904.44 
Poll taxes in the post-Reconstruction south45 usually ranged from $1.00 
to $2.00 per year, which was excessive for both poor black and white 
sharecroppers, given that sharecroppers were not typically paid in cash.46  
Because the tax was such a relatively small amount, it had the feature of 
being “no appreciable hindrance to voting for the well-to-do when its 
payment [was] a prerequisite to voting” but created “a serious burden for 
those of low economic status.”47  In 1901, one South Carolina congressman 
noted that many potential black voters did not bother to register to vote 
“because they would rather save the dollar which would be required as poll 
tax.”48  Additionally, some states made little or no effort to collect the poll 
tax while still requiring payment as a precondition to vote, or specified 
specific windows in which to pay the tax that did not coincide with 
elections.49  In many states, the taxes accrued over time when they were 
unpaid, so the individual would have to pay back taxes for every year they 
were unable to pay before they could exercise the right to vote.50  The 
effectiveness of the tax can be summarized by a statement by a woman in the 
Georgia backcountry when asked about the tax: “A dollar ain’t much if 
you’ve got it.”51 
B. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Ghosts of the New Deal 
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which ultimately 
banned the use of the poll tax as a means to disqualify voters in federal 
 
 43.  Lackey, supra note 25, at 427. 
 44.  Kelly Philips Erb, For Election Day, A History of the Poll Tax in America, FORBES (Nov. 
5, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/11/05/just-before-the-
elections-a-history-of-the-poll-tax-in-america/#508c6f164e44.  
 45.  For an examination of the variations in the poll tax requirements of the individual states, 
see FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH 39–40 (Univ. of Alabama Press, 1958). 
 46.  FIFE, supra note 12, at 19; KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 65. 
 47.  BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 2. 
 48.  KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 63. 
 49.  See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1032 (noting that Texas’s poll-tax provision 
required voters to present a receipt showing that their tax was paid between October 1st and January 
31st).  Receipt requirements also denied the franchise, as receipts could be lost in between payment 
of the tax and the election.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 389. 
 50.  KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 65; see also, C. VAN WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF THE 
SOUTH: 9 ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, 336 (1954); Ellis, supra note 13, at 1042. 
 51.  BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 16; Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman, The Second Battle for 
Woman Suffrage: Alabama White Women, the Poll Tax, and V. O. Key’s Master Narrative of 
Southern Politics, 68 J. SOUTHERN HISTORY 333, 347 (2002). 
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elections, is often referred to as a “forgotten amendment.”52  Although it is 
widely assumed that the amendment was passed as a result of the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s, the amendment actually traces its origins 
thirty years earlier, to the New Deal era.  Part I.B.1 discusses the New Deal 
origins of the effort to abolish the poll tax that culminated in the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment, Part I.B.2 discusses the amendment’s legislative 
history, and Part I.B.3 discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
amendment as exemplified by Harman v. Forsennius.53 
i. New Deal Efforts to Abolish the Poll Tax 
In the 1930s, early organizing campaigns sought federal involvement in 
abolishing the poll tax, and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) 
initially gave his full-throated support for the abolition, publicly framing the 
abolishment of the tax as an issue of class rather than race.54  In this era of 
expanding protections for workers’ rights and economic security, many bills 
died or were watered down in committees chaired by conservative 
Democrats from poll tax states.55  At the time, however, the South had the 
largest proportion of self-identifying “liberals,” here meaning supporters of 
progressive economic programs,56 than any other region in the country,57 and 
the Great Depression had greatly increased the number of white people 
affected by the tax requirement.58  The New Dealers hardly cared that these 
economic liberals, much like the Populists before them, included vehement 
racists.  In order to get these programs through Congress, FDR needed the 
support of poorer southern whites who were disproportionately 
disenfranchised by poll taxes but who had perhaps the greatest economic 
stake in the programs’ passage.59  Because of this widespread 
 
 52.  See Brendan F. Friedman, Note, The Forgotten Amendment and Voter Identification: 
How the New Wave of Voter Identification Laws Violates the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 343, 346 (2013); see also, Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the 
Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 N.W. U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2009) (“The 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment lies deep in the shadows.”); Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 375 
(describing the Amendment as one of the “‘great silences’ of the Constitution” and noting its “ironic 
superfluousness”). 
 53.  380 U.S. 528 (1965). 
 54.  MANFRED BERG, “THE TICKET TO FREEDOM”: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
BLACK POLITICAL INTEGRATION 105 (2005); Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71. 
 55.  See generally Louis Menard, How the Deal Went Down, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 24, 
2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-down. 
 56.  As noted above, many poorer whites in the South were economically liberal but socially 
and racially conservative.  Paul Krugman referred to these voters in a recent New York Times op-
ed as “racist populists.”  Paul Krugman, The Empty Quarters of U.S. Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/ralph-northam-howard-schultz.html?rref=co 
llection%2Fbyline%2Fpaul-krugman.  
 57.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71. 
 58.  OGDEN, supra note 45, at 182–85. 
 59.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71; Friedman, supra note 52, at 346. 
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disenfranchisement, there was a widely held belief that southern 
congressional delegations did not reflect the true economic policy 
preferences of the region.60 
The New Deal era brought legal challenges to the poll tax as well.  In 
1937, a white man sued over Georgia’s poll tax statute, claiming that it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Nineteenth Amendment, 
as Georgia did not collect the tax from women.  In Breedlove v. Suttles, the 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the scheme, 
finding it to be a legitimate nondiscriminatory method for raising revenue.61  
Ignoring the racist and classist motivations of the poll tax requirement, the 
Court instead viewed the tax as a neutral form of taxation which had long 
been used in the United States and other countries, equating it to the 
antebellum practice.62  The Court noted that: 
[T]he payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting is a familiar 
and reasonable regulation long enforced in many states and for more 
than a century in Georgia.  That measure reasonably may be deemed 
essential to that form of levy.  Imposition without enforcement 
would be futile.  Power to levy and power to collect are equally 
necessary.  And, by the exaction of payment before registration, the 
right to vote is neither denied nor abridged on account of sex.  It is 
fanciful to suggest that the Georgia law is a mere disguise under 
which to deny or abridge the right of men to vote on account of their 
sex.63 
The Breedlove decision, along with conservative Southern Democrats 
in Congress opposing FDR’s court packing plan, sparked a concerted effort 
to prohibit the poll tax by constitutional amendment.64  Although 
unsuccessful, debate surrounding the poll tax took up a great deal of political 
oxygen during the New Deal period, with many more liberal Democrats 
framing the issue of repeal as a class issue, as opposed to a race-based civil 
rights issue.65 
 
 60.  See BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 4 (“[T]he will of the majority of citizens has at times 
been thwarted by . . . men who have been chosen by a restricted electorate among whom there is a 
very small proportion of the workers in field or factory.”).  Roosevelt explicitly blamed the poll tax 
for many of his political problems and the inability to pass certain New Deal programs.  See STEVEN 
F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 57 (Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1976) (citing Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, to Aubrey 
Williams (Mar. 28, 1938), President’s Personal File 200, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library) (“I 
think the South agrees with you and me.  One difficulty is that three quarters of the whites in the 
South cannot vote–poll tax etc.”). 
 61.  Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
 62.  Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 281; see also, Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 393. 
 63.  Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 281. 
 64.  FIFE, supra note 12, at 19. 
 65.  Friedman, supra note 52, at 346. 
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FDR initially used the full weight of the bully pulpit to decry the poll 
tax requirement, labeling the more conservative southern leaders of the 
Democratic Party as representatives of “Polltaxia,” and openly challenging 
these members with more liberal candidates in Democratic primaries.66  As 
the Democratic Party was large and ideologically diverse at that time, with 
the South essentially being a one-party region, Roosevelt hoped that 
challenging the “Polltaxia” contingent would change the party’s 
congressional delegation to a more liberal and ideologically coherent 
caucus which would reliably back his New Deal initiatives.67  At the same 
time, Roosevelt secretly encouraged campaigns to repeal the poll tax at 
the state level.68 
The conservatives, however, mostly held onto their seats in the 
primaries of 1938, and forced the president to retreat on his call for an 
abolition of the poll tax.69  While Eleanor Roosevelt vigorously and vocally 
supported a full statutory ban on the practice even after this defeat,70 the 
President, stung by his rebukes in the southern primaries, remained much 
more cautious on the issue throughout the remainder of his presidency.71  
Regardless, FDR’s early embrace of the issue paved the way for future 
legislators to frame the repeal of the poll tax in terms of wealth 
discrimination.  This made the abolition of the tax a major priority of liberals 
and progressives in the following decades.72 
ii. The Long Road to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
At the end of the New Deal era, anti-poll tax efforts achieved moderate 
success in fits and starts.  During the Second World War, for example, 
Congress passed the Soldier Vote Act of 1942, which forbade states from 
levying a poll tax for absentee ballots in federal elections.73  The pressure 
to abolish the tax increased further when the Supreme Court struck down 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71 (“Roosevelt’s aim was nothing less than the 
transformation of the Democrats into an ideologically coherent liberal party that could sustain 
progressive politics on a national basis.”). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71. 
 70.  ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 191 (1992) (“I 
also remember wanting to get all-out support for . . . the removal of the poll tax, but though Franklin 
was in favor . . . [it] never became ‘must’ legislation.”).  Eleanor Roosevelt remained a vocal 
advocate against the poll tax both as First Lady and after she left the White House.  THE ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT ENCYCLOPEDIA 92 (Maurine H. Beasley et al., eds., 2001) (discussing Roosevelt’s 
collaborative efforts with Pauli Murray to organize the National Committee to Abolish the Poll 
Tax); id. at 94 (discussing her efforts to pressure the Truman administration on the issue). 
 71.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 77–78. 
 72.  Id. at 71; see also, BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 4. 
 73.  Soldier Vote Act, ch. 561, § 2, 56 Stat. 753, 753 (1942). 
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the “white primary”74 and the Republican Party placed opposition to the 
tax requirement in its 1944 platform.75  It was not until 1946, however, that 
the effort to establish what eventually became the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment took hold. 
Beginning in 1946, Senator Spessard Holland, a Florida Democrat, 
attempted to pass an Article V constitutional amendment to abolish the poll 
tax.76  His first proposal passed the House but died by filibuster in the 
Senate.77  He would repeat this quixotic effort over the next twelve years, 
repeatedly reintroducing the amendment in each new Congress.78  Five years 
before the amendment’s eventual passage, it seemed that these efforts would 
continue to be fruitless in perpetuity, both due to southern filibuster and the 
lack of interest on the part of three-fourths of the states.79 
Interestingly, despite the Twenty-Fourth Amendment being his 
signature achievement, Holland was a lifelong segregationist.80  Holland 
continually agitated for the amendment because he viewed the issue through 
the New Deal-era lens of class, rather than race, as he repeatedly stressed 
throughout the decades of debates on the issue.81  Although the poll tax was 
certainly a large piece of the Jim Crow recipe for disenfranchising black 
voters, other means, such as literacy tests, were likely far more essential 
ingredients for black disenfranchisement.82  In fact, by the time the 
amendment came before the states, all but five states had eliminated the 
practice entirely, largely due to the slow, piecemeal efforts of the New Deal-
era reformers.83 
Holland’s efforts were rewarded, however, in the early days of the 
Kennedy administration.84  With national public opinion slowly turning 
against Jim Crow in 1962, Holland’s amendment was attractive to a number 
 
 74.  Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also, Michael J. Klarman, The White 
Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 55 (2014) (describing Smith v. Allwright as “[t]he Court’s most important white 
primary decision”). 
 75.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 78. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 78–79.  
 79.  Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1038. 
 80.  See Associated Press, Spessard L. Holland Dies at 79; Former Senator From Florida, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/11/07/archives/spessard-l-holland-
dies-at-79-former-senator-from-florida.html. 
 81.  108 CONG. REC. 2851, 4154 (statement of Senator Holland) (“[T]he proposal does not 
come under the ordinary classification of the ordinary civil rights legislation.  It applies to 
majorities, to minorities, and to every person of every color.”). 
 82.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 79. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  When John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, fewer than 30 percent of all 1.4 million 
Southern blacks were eligible to cast a ballot.  See MARK R. LEVY & MICHAEL S. KRAMER, THE 
ETHNIC FACTOR 50–53 (Simon and Schuster, 1972). 
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of constituencies.  Some southerners in Congress felt that they could abolish 
the poll tax without changing the political reality of the region, and that 
coming out in favor of the amendment would give them cover to oppose 
more sweeping civil rights reforms.85  Desperate to contain the political 
fallout from the Freedom Rides,86 President Kennedy was anxious for an 
easy civil rights win that would not damage his reputation among white 
southerners, who might provide the difference in his 1964 reelection effort.87  
Although the amendment faced strong opposition from some prominent 
liberals and civil rights groups because of fears of setting a precedent 
requiring all civil rights issues to be passed by constitutional amendment, the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment ultimately passed Congress by incredible 
margins,88 almost thirty years after FDR’s initial campaign against 
“Polltaxia.” 
After passage in Congress, the amendment was quickly ratified by the 
states over the next sixteen months, propelled by the rising national interest 
in the civil rights movement.89  Remarkably, the struggle to abolish the tax 
over the decades “had suddenly become a relatively uncontroversial—if 
painfully inadequate—response to the country’s racial and economic 
problems.”90  The text of the amendment, now enshrined in the written 
constitution, provides that: 
[T]he right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or 
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for 
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in 
 
 85.  See Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 85–86 (“One of the strong factors in the poll tax 
amendment against which you seem to have a bad aversion but which has allowed many Senators 
to cast a Constitutional vote on a relatively non-important matter which gave them an out on vastly 
more important matters like the literacy bill.” (quoting Letter from Spessard L. Holland to E. H. 
Crowson (May 12, 1962))).  
 86.  See generally RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007). 
 87.  The Amendment was opposed by a number of more liberal senators in both parties, as 
well as civil rights groups such as the NAACP, as they thought that a constitutional amendment 
would force a precedent that future civil rights laws could only be passed through constitutional 
amendment, which would allow thirteen states to veto them.  See After the Poll Tax, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., Mar. 31, 1962, at 12; Anthony Lewis, Senate Approves Ban on Poll Tax in Federal Votes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1962), at A1. 
 88.  The vote tally for final passage was 77 to 16 in the Senate, and 294 to 86 in the House.  
108 CONG. REC. 2851, 17,670 (1962); The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 1962 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 
404.  Although the final passage was by overwhelming margins, moving the amendment through 
Congress was by no means easy.  For a complete and well-written history of the difficult legislative 
and procedural maneuvers involved in passing the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, see Ackerman & 
Nou, supra note 52, at 85–86. 
 89.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 87. 
 90.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 87. 
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Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.91 
Furthermore, “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”92 
iii. The Supreme Court Weighs In 
At the time of the amendment’s ratification, only five states still had a 
poll-tax qualification on the books.93  As the amendment concerned only 
federal elections, four states retained their tax requirement for state elections, 
thereby attempting to set up two separate sets of voting qualifications.94  
Indeed, Joe Patterson, the Mississippi Attorney General at the time of the 
amendment’s ratification, stated that “[s]ome machinery will have to be set 
up to reckon with two sets of voters—one for state elections and one for 
national elections,” and Alabama’s Attorney General, Richmond Flowers, 
lamented the “terrifically confusing” situation caused by the amendment’s 
passage.95 
The Virginia Legislature, anticipating the enactment of the amendment, 
had previously passed a law to ensure that its poll tax would be retained in 
state elections.96  The law permitted residents to vote for federal candidates 
by filing certificates of residence, but required annual payments of $1.50 a 
person for voting in state elections.97  In Harman v. Forsennius, the only case 
in history where the Supreme Court directly applied and interpreted the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, this practice was ultimately struck down.98  In 
holding that this dual system was “repugnant to the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment,” the Harman Court framed its understanding of the poll tax in 
both racial and economic terms.99 
The Court noted the “widespread national concern” with the poll tax in 
the lead up to the amendment’s passage, and described the “general 
 
 91.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 92.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 2. 
 93.  These states were Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. Ben A. Franklin, 
Impact of Poll Tax Has Waned in Last 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1964), https://www.nytimes 
.com/1964/01/24/archives/impact-of-poll-tax-has-waned-in-last-40-years.html. 
 94.  United Press Int’l, 24th Amendment, Banning Poll Tax, Has Been Ratified; Vote in South 
Dakota Senate Completes the Process of Adding to Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1964), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/24/archives/24th-amendment-banning-poll-tax-has-been-ratifi 
ed-vote-in-south.html.  Arkansas repealed its tax requirement for state elections by ballot initiative 
in 1964.  ARK. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORICAL INITIATIVES & REFERENDA ELECTION RESULTS 
(1938-2018) at 10, https://www.sos.arkansas.gov/uploads/elections/Initiatives_and_Amendment 
s_1938-2018_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2019). 
 95.  See United Press Int’l, supra note 94. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  380 U.S. 528 (1965). 
 99.  Id. at 533–34.   
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repugnance to the disenfranchisement of the poor occasioned by failure to 
pay the tax,” due to its nature of “exact[ing] a price for the privilege of 
exercising the franchise.”100  The majority opinion also observed that the poll 
tax was “a requirement adopted with an eye to the disenfranchisement of 
[black people] and applied in a discriminatory manner.”101 
Crucially, the Court began its analysis of the Virginia alternative to 
the poll tax by opining that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment “does not 
merely insure that the franchise shall not be ‘denied’ by reason of failure 
to pay the poll tax; it expressly guarantees that the right to vote shall not 
be ‘denied or abridged’ for that reason.”102  Comparing the new provision 
to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court declared that the Twenty-Fourth 
“‘nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes’ of impairing the 
right guaranteed.”103 
Thus, according to the Court, in order for the plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that the restriction was unconstitutional under the amendment, they needed 
to show that it “impose[d] a material requirement solely upon those who 
refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal elections 
without paying a poll tax.”104  The Court noted that the Virginia scheme was 
a “cumbersome procedure” that imposed a “real obstacle” for those citizens 
who asserted their constitutional right to vote free of a poll tax 
requirement.105  A State imposing a requirement upon voters who refused to 
pay the poll tax therefore abridged voting rights because of the refusal to pay 
the poll tax.106 
The Court gave no credence to the argument that the new dual scheme 
provided administrative benefits to the state, concluding that in federal 
elections “the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and 
no equivalent or milder substitute may be imposed.”107  In sweeping terms, 
the Court declared that “[a]ny material requirement imposed upon the federal 
voter solely because of his refusal to waive the constitutional immunity 
subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and must fall 
under its ban.”108  The amendment, the Court proclaimed, “was . . . designed 
to absolve all requirements impairing the right to vote in federal elections by 
reason of failure to pay the poll tax.”109 
 
 100.  Id. at 539. 
 101.  Harman, 380 U.S. at 540. 
 102.  Id. at 540.  
 103.  Id. at 540–41 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).  
 104.  Id. at 541. 
 105.  Id. at 542. 
 106.  Harman, 380 U.S. at 542. (emphasis added).  
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Harman, 380 U.S. at 542. 
 109.  Id. at 544. 
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Despite the bold pronouncements of the Harman decision, the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment was never successfully used again to challenge the 
constitutionality of a state statute.110  The legislative follow-up to the 
amendment in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the seminal case of Harper 
v. Virginia State Board of Elections111 helped ensure, however, that the 
prohibition of the poll tax requirement for the exercise of the franchise 
became a bedrock principle of the constitutional canon. 
C. The Death of the Poll Tax: The Voting Rights Act and Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections 
Although the Twenty-Fourth Amendment prevents states from 
conditioning voting on payment of the poll tax in federal elections, the states 
initially remained free to use the tax as a barrier in their state elections.  
While only four states retained the poll tax in the early 1960s, the Civil 
Rights Movement continued to press the national conversation in favor of 
civil and voting rights, including the absolute abolition of the tax requirement 
at the state level. 
That opportunity seemingly came with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  
The monumental legislation passed through Congress in the wake of 
“Bloody Sunday” and Martin Luther King Jr.’s march from Selma to 
Montgomery, Alabama, which turned a spotlight on the disenfranchisement 
of black voters in the South.112  The footage of King and other organizers 
like later Congressman John Lewis being brutally beaten on the Edmund 
Pettus Bridge stirred a nationwide call to action to protect the right to vote.113 
Although scholarly114 and popular media115 have explored the Act’s 
passage through Congress and the ways it has fundamentally affected 
voting rights and entered the national consensus, less attention has been 
given to the unique way in which the Act addressed the question of the poll 
tax in state elections. 
Instead of including an outright statutory ban on the practice in the final 
text of the Act, Congress instead engaged in a novel kind of “legal ju-jitsu” 
by issuing a list of “findings” that declared that the poll tax denies or abridges 
the constitutional right to vote.  Congress then directed the Attorney General 
to file a lawsuit urging the Supreme Court to strike down the remaining state 
 
 110.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 376. 
 111.  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 112.  BERMAN, supra note 38, at 4–6; DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 404 (1986). 
 113.  GARROW, supra note 112, at 404. 
 114.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 87–111.  See generally, THE FUTURE OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (David L. Epstein, et al. eds., 2006); Davidson, supra note 24. 
 115.  See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 38, at 13–64; ALL THE WAY (HBO Films 2016); SELMA 
(Paramount Pictures 2014). 
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poll tax requirements.116  The provision’s authors hoped that this approach 
would encode the elimination of the poll tax as a “superprecedent” 
through interbranch collaboration between Congress and the courts.117  
Rather than using the cumbersome and politically costly process of an 
Article V amendment, the Voting Rights Act’s sponsors hoped to 
collaborate with the judiciary to “crystalize commitments rooted in two 
generations of constitutional politics,” as exemplified by the public 
mobilization and legislative actions accompanying the New Deal and the 
Civil Rights Movement.118  As Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach 
explained to President Lyndon Johnson, involving both Congress and the 
courts in the effort was the “safest, swiftest, and most efficient course to 
eliminate the poll tax.”119 
The Supreme Court ultimately took up the issue in the 1966 case Harper 
v. Virginia State Board of Elections,120 holding that Virginia’s state poll tax 
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Writing for the six-justice 
majority, Justice William O. Douglas reversed the Court’s decision in 
Breedlove.  Interestingly, Douglas’s majority opinion made no mention of 
the tax’s purpose of disenfranchising black voters,121 and instead framed the 
issue as the state discriminating on the basis of wealth.122  The Court noted 
that although states have the right to regulate their own elections, these 
regulations must not “invidiously discriminate” and must be within the 
confines of the Equal Protection Clause.123  Speaking in the Warren Court’s 
trademark broad terms, the Court declared that states violate the Equal 
Protection Clause “whenever [they] make[] the affluence of the voter or 
payment of any fee an electoral standard.”124  Citing to the Court’s earlier 
voting rights jurisprudence, Douglas noted that the “political franchise of 
voting” is a “fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all 
 
 116.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 101, 109. 
 117.  Id. at 103–04. 
 118.  Id at 109. 
 119.  Memorandum from Att’y Gen’l Nicholas B. Katzenbach to Lyndon B. Johnson, President 
of the United States, Reasons Why the Department of Justice Has Favored the Mansfield-Dirksen 
Approach to Elimination of the Poll Tax (May 21, 1965); see also, Ackerman & Nou, supra note 
52, at 101-02.  The approach was not without its detractors—it was opposed by both liberals such 
as Ted Kennedy and Jacob Javits as well as segregationists like Strom Thurmond.  Id at 101–04.  
 120.  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 121.  See id. at 672 (Black, J., dissenting) (“It should be pointed out at once that the Court’s 
decision is to no extent based on a finding that the Virginia law . . . is being used as a device or 
mechanism to deny [black] citizens of Virginia the right to vote on account of their color.”). 
 122.  Id. at 666 (majority opinion). 
 123.  Id. at 666; see also, id. at 665 (“[T]he right of suffrage ‘is subject to the imposition of 
state standards which are not discriminatory.’” (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 
360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)). 
 124.  383 U.S. at 666. 
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rights.”125  As an illustration, the Court compared the poll tax requirement to 
a hypothetical tax on the right to speak, noting that while “no court would 
hesitate to strike it down as a blatant infringement of the freedom of speech,” 
“the poll tax as enforced . . . is a tax on the equally important right to vote.”126 
Douglas’s opinion contains many broad, sweeping declarations about 
the unacceptability of limiting exercise of the franchise by discriminating in 
favor of wealth.  The opinion declared that wealth, like race, has no bearing 
on one’s ability to be an informed voter,127 and that “a citizen, a qualified 
voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm.”128  
Douglas called this “the clear and strong command of our Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause.”129  He noted that “[t]he principle that denies the 
State the right to dilute a citizen’s vote on account of his economic status or 
other such factors, by analogy, bars a system which excludes those unable to 
pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay.”130 
Douglas also found fault with Virginia’s argument that the poll tax 
was more akin to an administrative fee in other state functions, like 
licensing drivers, which is applied equally to all citizens.  The Court stated 
that “the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the 
power to fix qualifications.”131  In comparing voting qualifications drawn 
on the basis of wealth to lines and practices drawn on the basis of race, 
Douglas opined that “[t]o introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure 
of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant 
factor.”132  The Court held that the degree of discrimination caused by the 
fee was irrelevant.  The fee itself as a prerequisite for voting “r[an] afoul 
of the Equal Protection Clause.”133  The Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
noted, requires “the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the 
election of state legislators.”134 
In overruling Breedlove, the Court noted that “the Equal Protection 
Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era” and that, in 
determining what constitutes a discriminatory practice, the Court has “never 
been confined to historic notions of equality” because “[n]otions of what 
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do 
 
 125.  Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
 126.  Id. at 665 n. 2 (quoting United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 254 (W.D. Tex. 1966)). 
 127.  Id. at 668 (“Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate 
intelligently in the electoral process.”). 
 128.  Id. at 667. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 670 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)). 
B - PARTELOW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:39 AM 
442 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:3 
change.”135  The Court then compared the attitude around the poll tax 
requirement to the Court’s evolution on the concept of “separate but equal” 
between Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education.136  In 
reversing the lower court and declaring the poll tax requirement 
unconstitutional, Justice Douglas forcefully concluded: “wealth or fee 
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote 
is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”137 
Harper is in keeping with many other Warren Court cases that found 
government distinctions based on wealth constitutionally deficient.138  
Although the Burger Court began to shift away from the bold 
pronouncements in Harper, holding that wealth is not a suspect class on par 
with race and applying the rational basis test to cases alleging wealth 
discrimination,139 Harper remains a landmark case in the constitutional 
canon.  Despite the ideological shift of the Court over time, it continues to 
cite Harper,140 and it will still apply strict scrutiny to cases involving wealth 
discrimination when a fundamental right, such as voting, is implicated.141 
Although Justice Douglas’s opinion fails even to mention the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment or the constitutional “findings” of the Voting Rights Act 
on the poll tax, Bruce Ackerman and Jennifer Nou posit that Harper deserves 
status as a superprecedent, similar to notable New Deal era cases such as 
United States v. Darby Lumber Company.142  In these cases, the Court uses 
its power to uphold landmark statutes and cement the American people’s 
popular sovereignty into the country’s larger constitutional canon.143  Harper 
stands for the notion that the American people, rather than simply the six 
 
 135.  Harper, 383 U.S. at 669. 
 136.  Id. at 669–70 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 536 (1896)). 
 137.  Id. at 670. 
 138.  See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating filing fees for divorce 
cases as applied to individuals unable to pay the fee); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
(holding that welfare beneficiaries possess a property right in their anticipated government benefits, 
and that such benefits cannot be terminated without a hearing); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (requiring states to provide legal counsel to indigent criminal defendants); see also, 
MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 42 (2d ed. 2015). 
 139.  See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); see also, Bertrall L. Ross II, Measuring Political Power: Suspect 
Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 341–43 (2016). 
 140.  See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003); Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 105 (2000). 
 141.  DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 43. 
 142.  312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 143.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 136.  For an extensive explanation of why these and 
other New Deal-era statutes and precedents should be given this special status as part of the “small 
c” constitutional fabric of the United States, see Luke Norris, The Workers’ Constitution, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1459, 1500–14 (2019). 
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justices in the majority, had ultimately rejected qualifying the right to vote 
on the basis of wealth once and for all. 
II. Civil Death: Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States 
To understand the connection between the poll tax and 
disenfranchisement for the failure to pay legal financial obligations, it is 
essential to explore the practice of felon disenfranchisement in the United 
States.  Part II.A. discusses the history of felon disenfranchisement in the 
United States.  Part II.B. discusses the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence 
surrounding the issue. 
A. The Origins of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States 
Unlike nearly every other western democracy, the United States forces 
inordinate civil penalties on people convicted of felonies, as opposed to 
criminal punishment alone.  These consequences often include fines, victim 
restitution, the loss of the right to serve on juries, and, crucially, the loss of 
the right to vote.144  In the 2000 election, approximately 4.7 million otherwise 
eligible Americans were prohibited from voting because they were 
incarcerated due to a criminal conviction, were serving terms of probation or 
parole, had previous criminal convictions, or had unpaid fees or court costs 
that were imposed on them as a condition of their conviction.145 
The disenfranchisement of felons has its roots in the Middle Ages 
concept of “civil death,” where individuals convicted of certain crimes were 
banished from the community and lost all legal rights, including their right 
to own and inherit property.146  This concept was brought to the United States 
by European colonists, although the colonists eventually abandoned 
stripping certain civil rights such as inheritance.147  In the early United States, 
only certain crimes were subject to disenfranchisement laws, but by the mid-
 
 144.  See Lauren Handelsman, Note, Giving the Barking Dog Bite: Challenging Felon 
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2005); 
Carlos M. Portugal, Comment, Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber: The Racial Impact of 
Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2003). 
 145.  Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of 
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 780, 797 (2002). 
 146.  Harry David Saunders, Civil Death – A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, 11 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 988, 988-992 (1970); see also Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological 
Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1060; 
Mark Haase, Civil Death in Modern Times: Reconsidering Felony Disenfranchisement in 
Minnesota, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2015); Handelsman, supra note 144, at 1879.  
 147.  Handelsman, supra note 144, at 1879. 
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nineteenth century several states prohibited felons who had committed 
serious crimes from casting a ballot.148 
Although the practice had roots in the Early Republic, felon 
disenfranchisement, like the poll tax, was openly weaponized against newly 
enfranchised black voters during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  In many post-Reconstruction constitutions, states expanded the 
limits of provisions revoking voting rights, by enumerating specific crimes 
they expected black people would be more likely to commit.149  Between 
1865 and 1900, eighteen states adopted laws restricting the voting rights of 
convicted criminals; thirty-eight states total had some type of felon voting 
restriction.150  For example, Alabama’s Constitutional Convention of 1901 
included the notes supporting proposed felon disenfranchisement provisions 
of delegate John B. Knox, stating that, “The Convention’s goal is to establish 
white supremacy in the State, within the limits imposed by the Federal 
Constitution,”151 illustrating the “ardent and persistent embrace by Southern 
racists of the criminal justice system as a means of racial domination.”152  
Today, states with higher numbers of black residents and a high proportion 
of non-white prison inmates are the states most likely to have strict criminal 
disenfranchisement laws.153 
These restrictive laws cast a wide net, and in some extreme cases, 
citizens may lose their right to vote for convictions of minor offenses, such 
as misdemeanors and felonies that do not even carry a prison term.154  First-
time offenders may even be disenfranchised after entering guilty pleas for 
minor felonies, an action that takes place frequently despite actual innocence 
as the offender cannot risk a much harsher sentence if they lose at trial.155 
 
 148.  Angela Behrens, et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: 
Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 
559, 563 (2003); Handelsman, supra note 144, at 1879.  
 149.  See FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 10; Wood & Trivedi, supra note 
5, at 31. 
 150.  Wood & Trivedi, supra note 5, at 32. 
 151.  Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, May 21 
to Sept. 3 (1901) (statement of Delegate John B. Knox concerning convict disenfranchisement 
provisions). 
 152.  Garrett Epps, The ‘Slave Power’ Behind Florida’s Felon Disenfranchisement, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-slave-power-
behind-floridas-felon-disenfranchisement/552269/. 
 153.  FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 10; Behrens, et al., supra note 148, at 
594, 596.  
 154.  FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4. 
 155.  See generally Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal 
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005); Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-
irrelevant/534171/; Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea 
Bargaining, THE ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05 
/plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/; Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed 
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Unsurprisingly, like many other practices in the criminal justice 
system,156 felon disenfranchisement laws have a racially discriminatory 
effect even if the law is facially neutral.  It is well established that people of 
color are disproportionately arrested and criminally convicted.  Although the 
gap has closed slightly in recent years, according to a report from the Pew 
Research Center, black men are still more than five times as likely as white 
men to be incarcerated in the United States.157 
If the goal of felon disenfranchisement was to prevent black people 
from voting, the laws have been incredibly effective, especially as mass 
incarceration greatly increased during the “tough on crime” era of the 1980s 
and 1990s.158  The number of black prisoners rose 68 percent between 1980 
and 1985, and then more than doubled by 1995.159  Data from the U.S. 
Department of Justice shows that 8.3 percent of all black males, ages 25 to 
29 in the United States, were in prison in 1996, as opposed to 2.6 percent of 
Hispanic males and just 0.8 percent of white males in the same age range.160  
While the rates of prison growth have slowed since the 1990s, the carceral 
state continues to have profound disproportional impact on the black and 
Latino communities. Indeed, “more African Americans are under 
correctional control today—in prisons or jail, on probation or parole—than 
 
American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/ 
nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html. 
 156.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 185–220 (rev. ed. 2012) 
(describing the disproportionate effects of mass incarceration on communities of color and 
specifically black men); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN 45-50 (2017) (exploring possible causes of 
racial disparities in state prisons); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of 
Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 57 (2014) (describing the Terry stop-and-frisk 
doctrine as “a central site of inequality, discrimination, and abuse of power”); Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
243, 244 (2015) (describing “the salience of race to the American practice of capital punishment”); 
Praatika Prasad, Note, Implicit Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an 
Integrated Response, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3092–3109 (2018) (discussing racial bias in 
prosecutors’ closing statements in criminal cases). 
 157.  John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is 
Shrinking, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/ 
01/12/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/ (“In 2016, there were 1,608 
black prisoners for every 100,000 black adults—more than five times the imprisonment rate for 
whites (274 per 100,000) and nearly double the rate for Hispanics (856 per 100,000).”). 
 158.  See generally Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough 
on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3 (2013). 
 159.  Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925-85, 
4 (1986) (noting 150,249 black prisoners in state and federal prisons in 1980), with CHRISTOPHER 
J. MUMOA & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 1996, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 9 (1997) 
(showing 220,700 black prisoners in state and federal prisons in 1985, and 541,900 black prisoners 
in that same category of facilities in 1995). 
 160.  DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 1997, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 11 (1998). 
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were enslaved in 1850,” and, as a result, “more [black men] are 
disenfranchised today than in 1870, the year the Fifteenth Amendment was 
ratified.”161  One scholar has observed that criminal offenders, who are 
disproportionately black, constitute “for the first time since slavery, a 
voteless caste” in the United States.162 
Unsurprisingly, felon disenfranchisement laws have had profound 
effects on the American political landscape, including the very fundamental 
methods of how our country’s political maps are drafted.  In the census 
conducted every decade, incarcerated individuals are typically counted as 
residents of the county where the prison is located.163  This artificially 
overinflates the population of these counties, which are overwhelmingly 
rural, white, and conservative, and leaves the areas where these individuals 
are from, which are often urban, diverse, and Democratic leaning, vastly 
undercounted.164  The disparity in the population data results in these white 
rural areas having more voting representation and political power in the 
legislative process at both the state and national level.165 
Additionally, the practice of felon disenfranchisement is impactful 
enough to have likely made the difference in at least one presidential 
election.  In 2000, for example, the Florida Secretary of State under 
Governor Jeb Bush, Katherine Harris, sent the state’s county election 
supervisors a list of 58,000 voters to “purge” from the voting rolls due to a 
felony conviction.166  Black Americans made up 11 percent of registered 
voters in Florida but 44 percent of voters on the list.  After the election, as a 
part of a settlement in a lawsuit against Florida by the NAACP, a data firm 
estimated that 12,000 voters who were disenfranchised during the election 
were mistakenly placed on the list.167  If 44 percent of these voters were 
African American, and 90 percent of African American voters voted for Al 
Gore, then at least 4,752 black Gore voters were mistakenly disenfranchised, 
almost nine times George W. Bush’s margin of victory of 537 votes.168 
 
 
 
 161.  ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 175. 
 162.  J. Whyatt Modesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. 
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 435, 436 (2001). 
 163.  Julie A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison Gerrymandering and 
the Dilution of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 325 (2018). 
 164.  Id. at 328–29  
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter 
Disenfranchisement, THE NATION (July 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-
2000-election-in-florida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement/. 
 167.  Berman, supra note 166. 
 168.  Id.; see also, DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 52. 
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B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence – Richardson v. Ramirez and Hunter v. 
Underwood 
Despite the obvious discriminatory intent and impact of felon 
disenfranchisement laws, the Supreme Court has given its explicit blessing 
of these laws’ constitutionality.  In the 1974 case Richardson v. Ramirez,169 
then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a six-justice majority, 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment grants an “affirmative sanction” to state 
laws that disenfranchise individuals with a criminal record.170  Three 
plaintiffs challenged a California constitutional provision which completely 
denied voting rights to all individuals convicted of an “infamous crime,” 
even if they had served their sentence.171  The plaintiffs, all of whom had 
successfully completed their parole, claimed that this provision of the 
California Constitution and its enabling statute denied them equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.172 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion denied the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim 
and declined to apply strict scrutiny, as the Court had applied in other voting 
rights cases, based on the majority’s understanding of the language in 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.173  Section 2, which allowed states 
to have their apportionment of representatives reduced if they denied the 
right to vote to qualified citizens, specifically exempted state efforts to 
disenfranchise individuals who “participat[e] in rebellion” or commit some 
“other crime.”174  Justice Rehnquist referred to the time of the amendment’s 
drafting and ratification to note that the “other crimes” language was never 
altered, and that at the time of the amendment’s ratification, “29 states had 
provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the 
legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of 
felonies or infamous crimes.”175  The Court also observed that after the Civil 
War, Congress readmitted the former Confederate States with acts that 
enabled a “fundamental condition”176 of prohibiting states from depriving 
citizens of the right to vote “except as a punishment for such crimes as are 
now felonies at common law.”177  Justice Rehnquist opined that, “[T]he 
exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in [section] 2 
 
 169. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 170.  Id. at 54. 
 171.  Id. at 26–27. 
 172.  Id. at 27. 
 173.  See id. at 42, 53–54.   
 174.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 175.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48. 
 176.  Id. at 52. 
 177.  Id. at 51; see also, id. at 48–52.  
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in the case 
of . . . other restrictions on the franchise.”178 
This “affirmative sanction” of felon disenfranchisement in the 
amendment’s plain language, as well as the historical evidence, was of 
“controlling significance” to the Court in “distinguishing such laws from 
other state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”179 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice William Brennan, 
dissented, deriding the Court’s “unsound historical analysis”180 and stating 
that felon disenfranchisement was “not forever immunized from the evolving 
standards of equal protection scrutiny.”181 
Justice Marshall would have applied strict scrutiny to the California law 
since the right to vote is fundamental.182  He noted that there was “no basis 
for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in the democratic process 
than any other citizen.”183  Although he did not touch on the racially 
discriminatory nature of felon disenfranchisement laws, Justice Marshall 
derided the laws as a state attempt to restrict access to the ballot to those who 
“support . . . the established order.”  In response to the state argument that 
disenfranchising felons prevents individuals from selfishly seeking to 
undermine the state’s penal values at the ballot box, Justice Marshall 
dismissed this argument as merely a “temporal majority” disenfranchising 
individuals with different views.184  Because the law is in need of constant 
revision in response to society’s changing needs, Justice Marshall felt that 
the state effort to disenfranchise felons who might favor change to 
society’s criminal laws “strikes at the very heart of the democratic 
process,”185 and that felon disenfranchisement was a relic of “the fogs and 
fictions of feudal jurisprudence” which “infring[es] upon the spirit of our 
system of government.”186 
More than a decade later, the Court took on another case concerning 
felon disenfranchisement.  Justice Rehnquist again delivered the opinion in 
Hunter v. Underwood.187  The plaintiffs in Hunter, a black woman and a 
white man, challenged the constitutionality of the provision of the Alabama 
Constitution of 1901 that disenfranchised all persons convicted of “any 
 
 178.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54–55.  
 179.  Id. at 54. 
 180.  Id. at 56 (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
 181.  Id. at 76. 
 182.  Id. at 77. 
 183.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 78. 
 184.  Id. at 82–83. 
 185.  Id. at 82. 
 186.  Id. at 86 (quoting Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731 (1914)). 
 187.  Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
B - PARTELOW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:39 AM 
Spring 2020] THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY POLL TAX 449 
crime . . . involving moral turpitude.”188  While the provision was by its plain 
language “racially neutral,” it had an undeniably discriminatory impact on 
black individuals.189  The Court then followed the approach of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Redevelopment Corp.190 to determine 
whether the law rose to the level of violating the Equal Protection Clause: 
“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results 
in a racially disproportionate impact . . . .  Proof of racially discriminatory 
purpose or intent is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”191  To violate the Equal Protection Clause, racial discrimination 
must have been a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind a law’s 
enactment, thus shifting the burden to the state to show that the law would 
have been enacted even without the discriminatory intent.192 
Citing to the legislative history of the 1901 constitution as well as the 
historical record of the time,193 the Hunter Court found that the section of the 
Alabama Constitution was enacted with the explicit intent of 
disenfranchising black voters and “certainly would not have been adopted 
by the convention or ratified by the electorate in the absence of the racially 
discriminatory motivation.”194  Although the state contended that the true 
purpose of the provision was to disenfranchise poor whites as well as black 
voters, the Court, without weighing the question of whether this 
discrimination against poor whites was a “permissible motive,” found that 
this would not negate the racially discriminatory motive of the Alabama 
convention.195  Furthermore, the Court stated, the intervening eighty years 
had not legitimated a provision enacted with explicit racially discriminatory 
intent.196  Declining to say whether the language would be constitutionally 
valid if enacted today, the Court held that the provision violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.197 
Justice Rehnquist concluded Hunter by attempting to reconcile the case 
with his Richardson opinion, stating that Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment certainly “was not designed to permit the purposeful racial 
discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [a provision] which 
 
 188.  Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223–24 (quoting ALA. CONST. OF 1901 § 182). 
 189.  Id. at 227. 
 190.  Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 191.  Id. at 264–65 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).   
 192.  Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977)). 
 193.  Id. at 228–31.  
 194.  Id. at 231. 
 195.  Id. at 232–33.  
 196.  Id. at 233. 
 197.  Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223. 
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otherwise violates section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment” and holding that 
nothing in Richardson indicated anything to the contrary.198 
The practical effect of Richardson and Hunter is that felon 
disenfranchisement laws are expressly permitted under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, unlike other restrictions on voting rights, they are beyond 
the reach of strict scrutiny so long as they are not expressly enacted at least 
in part with a racially discriminatory purpose.199 
Although it is nearly impossible to challenge a felon 
disenfranchisement law on equal protection grounds, attitudes toward these 
laws have changed significantly in both state legislatures and the public at 
large within the last decade.  It has become increasingly apparent that many 
states now see these laws as “a heritage of the old slave-power mindset, [that] 
have no business marring politics in a twenty-first century democracy.”200 
Since the Richardson and Hunter decisions, many states have loosened 
their felon disenfranchisement laws.  In Maine and Vermont, those convicted 
of a felony are still allowed to vote even while incarcerated.201  It appears 
that the tide in some states have turned against felon disenfranchisement, 
often in newsworthy ways.  For example, in three states where the legislative 
process has moved relatively slowly, governors have acted unilaterally to 
restore voting rights to certain classes of individuals with felony 
convictions.202  Newly elected Governor Andy Beshear recently signed an 
executive order restoring voting rights to more than 140,000 formerly 
incarcerated individuals in Kentucky.203  Similarly, in 2016, Virginia 
Governor Terry McAuliffe issued an executive order restoring the voting 
rights of all people with felonies who had completed their parole.204  Lastly, 
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order in 2018 
indicating his office would consider pardons to restore voting rights for 
 
 198.  Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223. 
 199.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218–27 (11th Cir. 2005); Madison 
v. State, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2007); Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000); see also, 
Sloan G. Speck, Note, “Failure to Pay Any Poll Tax or Other Tax”: The Constitutionality of Tax 
Felon Disenfranchisement, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1549, 1556 (2007). 
 200.  Epps, supra note 152. 
 201.  DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 51. 
 202.  See NAT’L. CONF. STATE LEGIS, Felon Voting Rights: Recent State Action, (Oct. 14, 
2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx. 
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Felons, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kentuckys-new-
governor-plans-to-restore-voting-rights-to-nonviolent-felons-11576152000. 
 204.  Van R. Newkirk II, How Letting Felons Vote Is Changing Virginia, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 
8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/virginia-clemency-restoration-of-
rights-campaigns/549830/. 
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individuals on parole, which could allow 35,000 formerly incarcerated 
people to get their voting rights back.205 
Florida recently overturned its policy of total felon disenfranchisement 
via ballot initiative during the 2018 midterm elections, after decades of being 
the largest state to disenfranchise citizens with felony convictions.206  Before 
the change in the law, 27 percent of all disenfranchised felons in the United 
States lived in Florida, and in 2016, more than 10 percent of all the state’s 
eligible voting-age population was disenfranchised due to felony 
convictions.207  Staggeringly, more than one-fifth of all black eligible voters 
in Florida were disenfranchised in 2016.208  The result direct result of this 
ballot initiative could be monumental, as Florida frequently plays a key role 
in national politics and presidential elections. 
While the successful Florida ballot initiative represents an incredible 
new opportunity for formerly incarcerated individuals to regain their voting 
rights, the Republican-controlled Florida legislature moved in early 2019 to 
mandate that these individuals must pay all of their outstanding legal 
financial obligations in order to qualify to have their voting rights restored.209  
This restriction, signed into law by Governor Ron DeSantis and recently 
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court, is estimated to halt or permanently 
obstruct the re-enfranchisement of many of the more than half-a-million 
people who will be affected by the LFO-repayment measure.210  The next 
part addresses these types of LFO restrictions in detail, along with their 
unique constitutional and sociological implications. 
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III. Disenfranchisement for Unpaid Legal Financial Obligations 
While the number of states that permanently disenfranchise individuals 
with felony convictions has decreased in recent years, the practice of 
restricting the voting rights of ex-offenders who still owe legal financial 
obligations (“LFOs”) remains shockingly prevalent. According to a 2019 
survey by the Civil Rights Clinic at Georgetown Law School, 30 states have 
some form of these laws on their books.211  Outstanding LFOs can include 
fees or fines attached to a criminal conviction, public citation, or expenses 
incurred during the course of legal proceedings or in the course of an 
individual’s incarceration.212  Sometimes these payments are related to the 
underlying charge, but other times they are merely a revenue source for the 
courts.213  High interest rates and late fees can often compound debts.214 
States can statutorily tie LFO obligations to disenfranchisement in two 
ways.  The first type is categorized by a 2016 report as “direct” LFO 
disenfranchisement, where the disenfranchisement statute specifically 
requires repayment of these obligations for regaining the right to vote.215  Of 
the thirty states that engage in LFO disenfranchisement, eight have laws that 
explicitly state a person’s voting rights are revoked if LFOs are unpaid.216  
Others engage in “de facto” LFO disenfranchisement, where the state does 
not specifically require LFO repayment as a condition of re-
enfranchisement, but effectively does so by mandating completion of 
probation or parole, and subsequently requires LFO repayment as a condition 
of that completion.217 
Paying off these debts can be extremely difficult for people recently 
released from prison for various socioeconomic reasons.  Individuals are 
often caught in a cycle of debt where, even if the amount owed is minimal, 
people may struggle to pay.  Many jurisdictions also charge interest when 
the debt goes unpaid, causing the debt to accumulate.  Simultaneously, as 
 
 211.  GEORGETOWN LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC, CAN’T PAY, CAN’T VOTE: A NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON THE MODERN POLL TAX 21 (2019), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2019-
07/CLC_CPCV_Report_Final_0.pdf ; see also, Karin Martin & Anne Stuhldreher, These People 
Have Been Barred From Voting Today Because They’re In Debt, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:00 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/08/they-served-their-time-but 
-many-ex-offenders-cant-vote-if-they-still-owe-fines/. 
 212.  FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 5. 
 213.  Id. at 11. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 7. 
 216.  While most of the states with direct disenfranchisement for unpaid LFOs are in the former 
Confederacy, Connecticut, Washington State, and Arizona also have these statutes on their books.  
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a(a) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520 (2019); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-912 (20129); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905; see also, GEORGETOWN LAW 
CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC, supra note 211, at 21. 
 217.  GEORGETOWN LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC, supra note 211, at 25; FREDERICKSEN & 
LASSITER, supra note 4, at 7. 
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these debts only increase, many incarcerated people are not able to work for 
pay, and those that can are paid at alarmingly low rates, sometimes less than 
fifty cents an hour.218  Criminal records can make it difficult for people to 
find jobs, and without a source of income, the released individual will 
struggle to pay bills and put food on the table.  Choosing between essentials 
such as food and shelter or court-ordered debts is not a difficult choice to 
make.219  As interest accrues, the cycle of debt continues.  Some states also 
have provisions where unpaid LFOs carry prison time.220  Even in states 
where courts are required to inquire into a person’s ability to pay before 
assessing a LFO, many effectively ignore this obligation. 
Although critics and Democratic politicians have widely noted the 
similarities between the poll tax and LFO voting requirements,221 especially 
in the wake of the 2019 Florida imposition,222 courts have all but 
unanimously rejected arguments that the practice is unconstitutional under 
both the Equal Protection Clause and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.  The 
Fourth,223 Sixth,224 Ninth,225 and Eleventh226 circuits, for example, all have 
 
 218.  Ruben J. Garcia, U.S. Prisoners’ Strike is a Reminder How Common Inmate Labor Is, 
CBS News (Sept. 3, 2018, 5:51AM) (“Inmates have claimed in lawsuits that they earned as little 
as 12 cents an hour—or nothing as all, as is legal in some states.”); Daniel Moritz-Rabson, ‘Prison 
Slavery’: Inmates Are Paid Cents While Manufacturing Products Sold To Government, 
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/prison-slavery-who-benefits-
cheap-inmate-labor-1093729. 
 219.  Nareissa Smith, No Money, No Vote: How Imposed Fines, Fees and Costs Keep Black 
People From Voting, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Nov. 30, 2017), https://atlantablackstar.com/2017 
/11/30/no-money-no-vote-imposed-fines-fees-cost-keep-black-people-voting/. 
 220.  FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 10. 
 221.  See, e.g., Cory Booker (@CoryBooker), TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2019, 4:37 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/CoryBooker/status/1121196374840754176 (“This is a poll tax.”); Hillary Clinton 
(@HillaryClinton), TWITTER (May 7, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/ 
1125835719488999425 (“No one should have their right to vote taken away because of fines.  The 
Florida GOP’s measure requiring people to pay court-ordered fees before regaining access to the 
ballot is a modern-day poll tax unworthy of our democracy.”); Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), 
TWITTER (March 19, 2019, 11:56 AM), https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1108083568918564865 
(“A poll tax by any other name . . .”). 
 222.  Dartunorro Clark, Florida on Verge of Blocking Some Ex-Felons from Voting. Critics 
Call It a Poll Tax., NBC NEWS (May 3, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/pol 
itics-news/florida-verge-blocking-some-ex-felons-voting-critics-call-it-n1001916. 
 223.  Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that Virginia’s $10 fee to 
begin the process of civil rights restoration did not violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment). 
 224.  Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746-51 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that Tennessee’s law 
requiring the payment of victim restitution and outstanding child support as a precondition to 
restoration of voting rights did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment). 
 225.  Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 226.  Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Florida’s policy of 
reinstating felons’ voting rights based solely on the discretion of an Executive Clemency Board did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
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explicitly held that states are able to enact barriers to reinstating the franchise 
for ex-felons, including requiring full payment of LFO obligations. 
Indeed, nearly every court considering the question has dismissed equal 
protection and Twenty-Fourth Amendment claims regarding LFO 
requirements227 because Richardson provides a carve-out from Harper, 
whereby felons no longer have a fundamental right to vote.228  Rather, these 
cases deal with the restoration of a fundamental right, rather than a denial of 
a fundamental right.229  Accordingly, instead of applying a form of 
heightened scrutiny, they apply the deferential rational basis test to find that 
these laws are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.230  These courts 
have held that the states have a rational basis “for restoring voting rights to 
only those felons who have completed the terms of their sentences, which 
includes the payment of any fines or restitution orders.”231  Even though 
these requirements might seriously affect the ability of certain felons to vote 
“based on . . . differing income statuses,”232 the fact that they are felons, and 
therefore within the purview of Richardson and its progeny, takes the LFO 
requirements outside of the scope of Harper’s prohibition of conditioning 
the vote based on wealth. 
IV. Eliminating the Twenty-First Century Poll Tax 
The Court has never explicitly reconciled its decisions regarding felon 
disenfranchisement in Richardson and Hunter with Harper’s much broader 
decision decrying the per se unconstitutionality of conditioning voting on 
payment of a fee.  Although lower courts have held that LFO 
disenfranchisement is governed under the Richardson line of cases, these 
courts err in not giving Harper and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment greater 
weight in deciding the constitutionality of this practice. 
Despite cases upending voting rights in recent years, the Court has 
“retained a sound intuition” that Harper and the prohibition on the poll tax 
“has deep roots in our current constitutional order, and that it would be a 
grievous mistake to cut our mooring lines to this particular triumph of the 
civil rights era.”233  As David Schultz and Sarah Clark argue, this should 
 
 227.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 377. 
 228.  See, e.g., Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746; Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 766-69 (Wash. 2007). 
For a more nuanced understanding of the subtle differences in the facts and holdings of these 
particular cases, see Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the 
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 387–96 (2012). 
 229.  Cammett, supra note 228, at 388. 
 230.  See, e.g., Madison, 163 P.3d at 772; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079. 
 231.  Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079. 
 232.  Madison, 163 P.3d at 769. 
 233.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 134; see also, Modesire, supra note 162, at 438 
(noting that the hard won victories of the Civil Rights Movement “became the springboard for the 
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be extended to our collective understanding of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment as “a rejection of [the] linkage between wealth and voting, and 
a severing of the assumption that property or income is a prerequisite to 
having a political voice.”234 
Although Harper did not explicitly rely on the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment in its opinion, both Harper and the text of the amendment, when 
taken together, provide a “superprecedent” in our constitutional canon 
against abridging voter qualifications based on wealth, which deserves far 
greater deference by courts than it has been given to date.235  Popular 
understanding is that Harper’s failure to mention the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment and its expansive read of the Fourteenth severely limited the 
Twenty Fourth’s legal effect.  However, this misunderstands the history of 
the Harper decision.  As Bruce Ackerman and Jennifer Nou explain, Harper 
should be read in conjunction with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as 
enshrining the struggles of the New Deal and Civil Rights-eras to end wealth 
discrimination in the nation’s constitutional fabric.236 
The practice of LFO disenfranchisement amounts to a poll tax within 
the contemplation of both the text of the constitution and monumental 
Supreme Court precedent that provides the capstone to the struggles of the 
New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement.  Like the postbellum poll taxes 
in the South, disenfranchising individuals who owe financial obligations to 
the state discriminates on the basis of race and the basis of wealth.  Like the 
poll tax, it has a disproportionate effect on people of color and those who 
would vote against the calcified economic interests in state legislatures.  
Disenfranchising otherwise qualified voters due to financial obligations 
“may today be strictly localized,” but “its results are felt by the nation as a 
whole.”237  This “differential in voting requirements affects both the 
economic and political life of the nation.”238 
Courts have incorrectly framed the issue of LFO disenfranchisement 
by failing to take into account the “superprecedent” of the poll-tax 
prohibition.  Although a state may deny felons the right to vote for any 
period of time, it does not follow that once a state enacts processes whereby 
an individual may regain his franchise rights, those processes may be 
 
final legal assault in the Jim Crow laws which had deprived African Americans the vote since 
Reconstruction”). 
 234.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 377. 
 235.  See Speck, supra note 199, at 1566 (“Douglas Mentions the Twenty-fourth Amendment 
nowhere in his opinion, but the Amendment and Harper fit together tightly.”). 
 236.  See generally Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 134–35. 
 237.  BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 4. 
 238.  Id. 
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conducted in arbitrary and discriminatory ways that fail to comport with 
the other provisions of the Constitution.239 
This Article argues that the practice should be deemed both an 
impermissible poll tax under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as well as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Richardson notwithstanding.  Part 
IV.A. describes how courts should view LFO disenfranchisement through 
the lens of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as the framers envisioned it, and 
Part IV.B. then describes how courts should properly conduct an Equal 
Protection Clause analysis of LFO disenfranchisement provisions. 
A. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment – A Constitutional Sleeping Giant 
Although in the last decades lawyers have made efforts to employ the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment in litigation about a number of voting rights 
issues, including voter identification laws, these efforts have been sporadic 
and unpersuasive to courts.240  To this day, the only restriction struck down 
under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was the Virginia proof-of-residency 
requirement in Harman.241  Although courts and the public at large view the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment as a footnote or a forgotten piece of history 
aimed at one specific practice, this fundamentally ignores the history of the 
movement to abolish the poll tax, as well as the intentions of the 
amendment’s framers.  Evidence in both the language of the amendment as 
well as its legislative history suggests that it was meant to be a dynamic and 
adaptable part of the constitution. 
The language of the amendment suggests it should be broadly 
construed.  Critically, the amendment prohibits the right of citizens to vote 
in federal elections from being “denied or abridged” on account “of failure 
to pay any poll tax or any other tax.”242  As the legislative history, Supreme 
Court decision in Harman, and academic commentators have noted, the “any 
other tax” provision should be construed broadly to include other devices 
meant to prevent voting based on wealth discrimination, and finally 
disposing of the notion that wealth and property should be connected to one’s 
ability to participate in democratic self-government.243 
 
 239.  Judge Karen Nelson Moore’s scathing and well-researched dissent in Johnson, in 
particular, provides a compelling analysis of why LFO disenfranchisement violates both the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.  Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 756, 
760 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting).  Much of the analysis, infra, is structured around and 
supplements her forceful arguments.  
 240.  Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 376.  
 241.  Id. at 404. 
 242.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, §1. 
 243.  See Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 416; Speck, supra note 199, at 1556 (“[The 
Amendment] creates a broad, absolute prohibition on voter qualifications that in any way implicate 
economic means.  The Supreme Court’s response to states’ attempts to circumvent the poll tax ban 
illustrates a broad reading of the Twenty-fourth amendment.”); see also, Schultz & Clark, supra 
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The popular legal canon suggests that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
remains as a vestigial organ of the constitution that no longer has a function 
in the post-Harper jurisprudence.244  This, however, misreads both the 
intentions of the framers of the amendment and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the topic of the poll tax. 
Much of the legislative and executive history of the amendment 
suggests that both the amendment’s framers and President Johnson 
anticipated that the amendment would be construed broadly to apply beyond 
the traditional poll-tax requirement.245  These floor statements by the 
amendment’s supporters wholeheartedly decry not just the poll tax as it was 
being practiced at the time, but the practice of “pay[ing] for the right to 
vote.”246  Congressman Dante Fascell, a Democrat from Florida, perhaps 
summarized this sentiment best: “[T]he payment of money, whether directly 
or indirectly, whether in a small amount or in a large amount, should never 
be permitted to reign as a criterion of democracy.  There should not be 
allowed a scintilla of this in our free society.”247  President Johnson also 
remarked upon the amendment’s passage that it stood for the proposition that 
“there can be no one too poor to vote.”248  It is curious, then, why courts and 
practitioners have been so hesitant to use the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to 
challenge “equivalent or milder substitutes” to the poll tax, when these 
 
note 11, at 419 (suggesting that a “poll tax or other tax” should be read to include any monetized 
cost which “directly or indirectly imposes an additional cost on voters in their casting of a vote 
such that it would discourage individuals from voting”).  
 244.  See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1457, 1459, 1481–82 (2001) (“[T]he net effect of the Twenty-fourth Amendment was, at most, to 
abolish the poll tax in federal elections, in a few states, two years before it would have been 
abolished across the board anyway.”); Speck, supra note 199, at 1566 (“Harper thus appears to 
essentially obviate any practical need for the Twenty-fourth Amendment.”). 
 245.  Friedman, supra note 52, at 364. 
 246.  108 CONG. REC. 17, 662 (1962) (statement of Rep. Joelson); see also, id. at 4154 
(statement of Sen. Holland); id. at 4585 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (noting that the amendment 
would prohibit his state’s practice of “unjustly discriminat[ing] against people of limited means”); 
id. at 17,657 (statement of Rep. Fascell) (stating that the struggle to abolish the poll tax was a 
struggle to ensure “that no American must pay for the privilege of exercising his constitutional 
privilege—the right to vote”); id. at 17,660 (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (“I hope [the amendment] 
will be passed by an overwhelming vote. No person should have to pay for the privilege of 
voting.”); id. at 17,665 (statement of Rep. Addabbo) (“I believe it is our responsibility to at least 
give to all those qualified to vote the right to do so without having to pay for that right and to 
continue to work for the moral rights of all.”); id. (statement of Rep. Dingell) (noting that the text 
of the amendment “prohibits other taxes being used as a device to evade the legislative purpose of 
the amendment”).  
 247.  108 CONG. REC. 17,657 (1962) (statement of Rep. Fascell). 
 248.  Nan Robertson, 24th Amendment Becomes Official – Johnson Hails Anti-Poll Tax 
Document at Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1964), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/times 
machine/1964/02/05/97168103.html. 
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practices are precisely what its congressional sponsors, the president, and 
even the Supreme Court indicated the amendment prohibits.249 
Although courts and practitioners have been slow to use the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment as intended by its framers, academics and commentators 
have begun to recognize the amendment for its potential as a sleeping giant 
of great constitutional significance.250  Accordingly, courts should not 
hesitate to apply Harman and the amendment’s legislative history to strike 
down poll taxes, substitutes for the poll tax, and—critically— “any other 
tax” that denies or abridges voting rights.251 
Once distilled, the principles at issue in both Harman and the legislative 
history of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment evidence that LFO 
disenfranchisement is plainly within the meaning of the amendment’s text as 
drafted by its framers.  If the test for the “any other tax” provision is the same 
as, or similar to, the test deployed in Harman, a plaintiff would need to 
demonstrate that a restriction imposes a material requirement solely upon 
those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal 
elections without paying “a tax.”  The two questions that must be answered 
in a Twenty-Fourth Amendment inquiry, therefore, are: (1) whether LFO 
disenfranchisement schemes either “abridge” or “deny” the right to vote, and 
(2) whether LFOs constitute a “tax” within the meaning of the Amendment. 
As to the first question, courts weighing the issue have decided that 
LFO restrictions for convicted felons do not abridge or deny the right to vote 
because, by the language of Richardson and Hunter, felons do not have a 
fundamental right to vote in the first place.  These courts fail to note, 
however, that this principle is distinguishable by reading the “affirmative 
sanction” of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the 
Twenty-Fourth.  Because the Twenty-Fourth was enacted nearly one 
hundred years after the Fourteenth, the language of the Fourteenth—which 
affirms the ability of states to deny voting rights to felons—should be subject 
to the later-enacted constitutional text, including that a state may not deny or 
abridge these rights in a way that constitutes “a poll tax or any other tax.” 
 
 249.  Harman v. Forsenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965). 
 250.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 136 (“[C]ourts are duty bound to take [the 
constitutional principles behind Harper and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment] with high seriousness 
as they struggle to interpret the constitutional meaning of democracy in the twenty-first century.”); 
id. at 145 (“[W]e believe that it is past time for the Supreme Court to admit Twenty-Four into the 
constitutional canon.”); Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 420 (“[T]he broader purpose of the 
Twenty-fourth Amendment is to break the linkage between wealth and democracy in the United 
States.”); Wood & Trivedi, supra note 5, at 43–45; Speck, supra note 199, at 1567–68. 
 251.  Harman considered only restrictions that “imposed a material requirement solely upon 
those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote without paying a poll tax.”  380 U.S. 
at 541.  The Court, however, has never interpreted the other clause of the amendment, which states 
that the vote may not be denied or abridged by reason of failure to pay “any other tax.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXIV, §1. 
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By the plain language of Richardson and Hunter, a state may deny 
felons the right to vote as a category so long as it does not enact these 
disenfranchisement statutes in an explicitly discriminatory manner.  But 
states that re-extend the franchise to felons on the condition that they have 
paid LFOs have re-conferred a fundamental right to these individuals.252  It 
follows that when states regrant the right to vote only to some formerly 
incarcerated people, those individuals who have not paid their LFOs could 
vote but for their failure to pay these obligations.  The right to vote for people 
who have not paid the LFOs, therefore, is “abridged” by that failure to pay. 
The second question is whether these fines constitute a “tax” within the 
meaning of the amendment.  To understand what the amendment means by 
“other tax,” courts should first be “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he 
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and 
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
technical meaning.’”253  A “tax” is defined as “a compulsory contribution to 
state revenue, levied by the government on workers’ income and business 
profits, or added to the cost of some goods, services, and transactions.” 
While LFOs may be better classified as “fees” or “debts” rather than a 
“tax” in the literal sense, Harman makes clear that the amendment prohibits 
not just the practice of the direct poll tax, but also the practice of setting a 
price for voting.254  The similarities between LFO disenfranchisement and 
the classic “poll tax” at issue in the Harman decision show that LFO 
disenfranchisement amounts to a “tax on voting” within the meaning of the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment. 
Given that the Supreme Court may now be more open to arguments 
about the legislative history of the statutes and constitutional provisions they 
interpret,255 it is useful to conduct an analysis of the amendment’s legislative 
history for what exactly constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of the 
amendment.  This history suggests that LFO payments fall within the 
meaning of the amendment’s text.  For example, the committee report from 
 
 252.  See DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 43; Cammett, supra note 228, at 388. 
 253.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 
282 U.S. 716, 731 1931) (alteration in original); see also, Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 768 
(2010) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 254.  Harman, 380 U.S. at 541. 
 255.  Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dead at 79, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 
2016, 5:14 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/breaking-news-supreme-court-justice-
antonin-scalia-dead-at-the-age-of-79-219246. Justice Scalia had a career-long distrust of legislative 
history, see generally James J. Brudney & Corey Dislear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008), 
whereas his successor, Justice Gorsuch, makes use of it; see Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, 
Symposium, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185 (discussing how then-
Judge Gorsuch turned to ‘“traditional tools of statutory interpretation in an effort to discern 
Congress’s meaning,’ including legislative history—a striking departure from Justice Scalia’s 
textualism”). 
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the House of Representatives noted that the amendment would extend far 
beyond the quintessential poll tax and “would . . . prevent both the United 
States and any State from setting up any substitute in lieu of a poll tax.”256  
This included “preventing the nullification of the amendment’s effect by a 
resort to subterfuge.”257  This language and intent suggest that states could 
not avoid implicating the amendment by repackaging the poll tax by another 
means outside the technical definition of a “poll tax” or “other tax.” 
Additionally, debates surrounding the amendment in both houses 
suggest that its sponsors believed that the “other tax” language would 
encompass all payments to the government generally, even if not technically 
within the definition of a “tax.”  For example, Representative Gonzalez 
indicated that “there should not be any price tag or any other kind of tag on 
the right to vote.”258  Representative Fascell understood the amendment to 
make clear that “the payment of money whether directly or indirectly, 
whether in a small amount or in a large amount should never be permitted to 
reign as a criterion of democracy.”259  Representative Joelson noted that the 
amendment sought to target “areas in which American citizens are required 
to pay for the right to vote.”260  Representative Halpern noted his hope that 
the amendment would “outlaw[] th[e] undemocratic, feudal practice of 
placing a price tag on the right to vote.”261  Finally, Senator Javits spoke of 
the amendment’s elimination of any “encumbrance” bearing the “character” 
of the poll tax.262 
Furthermore, by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amendment’s 
text in Harman, the amendment’s purpose was to prohibit “sophisticated as 
well as simple minded” attempts to deny the vote to the poor and the 
indigent.  It is apparent that the amendment’s drafters and the Harman Court 
meant the amendment to be not a vestigial piece of constitutional language 
aimed at a practice that had been diminished in all but four states, but to 
extend to reach all denials or abridgments of the right to vote by reason of 
failure to pay a monetary obligation, whether technically structured as a tax, 
fee, or debt.  Because the payment of LFOs “exact[s] a price for the privilege 
of exercising the franchise,”263 it certainly bears the “character” of a tax on 
voting.264  LFOs are a “forced monetary contribution paid to the government 
 
 256.  H.R. Rep. No. 87 – 1821 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4033 (1962).  
 257.  1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4037. 
 258.  Abolition of Poll Tax in Federal Elections: Hearing on H.J. Res. 404, 425, 434, 594, 601, 
632, 655, 663, 670, & S.J. Res. 29 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1962). 
 259.  108 CONG. REC. 17657 (1962). 
 260.  Id. at 17662. 
 261.  Id. at 17661 
 262.  Id. at 4155. 
 263.  Harman v. Forsenius, 380 U.S. 528, 539 (1965). 
 264.  108 Cong. Rec. at 4155. 
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for the benefit of the government or the general public,” which “abridge” the 
right to vote, and thus plainly fall within the type of state action prohibited 
by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. 
B. Equal Protection: Irrational Laws and Uncompelling State Interests 
Even if courts fail to see that LFO disenfranchisement is a poll tax 
prohibited by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, they should still find the 
practice to violate the Equal Protection Clause.265  While Ackerman and Nou 
extensively criticize Douglas’s opinion for failing to acknowledge the debt 
it owed to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, they 
believe that Harper should be read as the “third and final stage of a larger 
process through which the American people successfully repudiated wealth 
discrimination at the ballot box.”266  Indeed, “we should place Harper in its 
higher lawmaking context, and reinterpret it as codifying a larger effort by 
the American people, during the 1960s, to create a more egalitarian 
democracy.  Harper is not the product of an activist Court, but of an activist 
people.”267  Because Harper crystallized the popular sovereignty of the 
American people—expressed through both a constitutional amendment and 
a “super statute”268 —courts need to “take this point with high seriousness as 
they struggle to interpret the constitutional meaning of democracy in the 
twenty-first century.”269 
Furthermore, some scholars stress that Justice Rehnquist’s historical 
and originalist arguments may have been off base in Richardson.  For 
example, Professor Gabriel Chin posits that the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement provision on racial disenfranchisement is inconsistent with 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Fifteenth Amendment 
should be understood as repealing, or at least modifying, the language of 
Section 2.270  It is equally probable that Justice Rehnquist failed to take into 
consideration the clause’s relationship with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.  
If each successive amendment can be understood as taking into consideration 
the earlier written constitution, Section 2 should be read with the 
understanding that the states may sanction disenfranchisement for “other 
 
 265.  See Cammett, supra note 228, at 396–402. 
 266.  Ackerman and Nou posit that although it was a mistake and an unfortunate oversight that 
Justice Douglas failed to acknowledge the Twenty-Fourth Amendment or Section 10 in his opinion, 
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 269.  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 136. 
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crimes” but must avoid doing so in a way that constitutes a “poll tax or other 
tax” that “denies or abridges” voting rights. 
The affirmative sanction of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, 
means that states are essentially free to engage in felon disenfranchisement 
outside the watchful eye of the Court’s strict scrutiny.  Despite the 
overwhelming sociological and statistical evidence of the racially disparate 
impact that the practice of felon disenfranchisement and the criminal justice 
system as a whole have on both people of color and the poor, the plain text 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Richardson’s reading of it essentially 
cordon off felon disenfranchisement from equal protection challenges in all 
but the rare explicitly discriminatory cases.  Richardson essentially 
guarantees the constitutionality of state felon disenfranchisement laws.  
Thus, any wholesale repeal of this practice will have to come through an 
Article V constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court revisiting 
Richardson, or through popular pressure on state legislatures to change their 
voter qualification laws or criminal codes. 
Furthermore, despite Harper’s sweeping language regarding wealth 
discrimination, the Court’s subsequent case law has made it abundantly clear 
that wealth is not a suspect class.271  These cases, in addition to both 
Richardson and Hunter’s findings that felons lack a fundamental right to 
vote, means that LFO disenfranchisement provisions are analyzed under 
rational basis review rather than strict or intermediate scrutiny.272 
For a law to pass rational basis scrutiny, it must be rationally related to 
a legitimate government interest.273  Although courts have recognized 
legitimate state interests in regard to LFOs, such as ensuring compliance with 
court orders and requiring felons to complete terms of their sentence, the 
practice of restoring the franchise only to those with the means to pay is 
insufficiently related to these interests to survive a rational basis analysis.  
Indeed, “preconditioning suffrage on a payment that a person is unable to 
make is [not] in any rational way related to the government’s interest in 
promoting that payment.”274 
Regarding the first state interest, Supreme Court precedent suggests that 
restrictions that fail to take into account those who are unable but willing to 
pay are disfavored,275 especially when done with an ancillary connection to 
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unconstitutionally when it revoked an individual’s probation because he was unable to pay fines 
and restitution payments, without a determination that he had made a bona fide effort to pay); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (finding that a statute prohibiting individuals who 
B - PARTELOW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:39 AM 
Spring 2020] THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY POLL TAX 463 
the purported interest276 and when a more direct means of asserting the 
interest is available.277  Revoking a legal right or privilege from a person who 
is unable to make restitution payments “through no fault of his own . . . will 
not make restitution suddenly forthcoming.”278  States are effectively forcing 
someone who is unable to pay to choose between food on the table and a 
vote at the ballot box.  Tying repayment to voting rights is unlikely to compel 
these individuals to pay their LFOs any more quickly than if the franchise 
was not so conditioned.  These restrictions “embod[y] nothing more than an 
attempt to exercise unbridled power over a clearly powerless group, which 
is not a legitimate state interest.”279 
A second commonly asserted state interest in upholding LFO 
disenfranchisement, that elections need to be protected from felons who 
continue to break the law via their noncompliance with court-mandated 
payments, is “nothing ‘more than a naked assertion that [a felon’s] poverty 
by itself’ is a sufficient reason to disqualify the felon from regaining the right 
to participate in the exercise of democracy.”280  Although a state may take 
certain things, like “[r]esidence requirements, age, and previous criminal 
record”281 into consideration when deciding qualifications for its voters, once 
a state allows those with a previous criminal record to restore their right to 
vote by completion of a financial payment, it “makes the affluence of the 
voter or payment of [a] fee an electoral standard,” which is explicitly 
prohibited by Harper.282  By opening the door to some former felons, who 
have the means to pay their LFOs, the state “ceases to rely on the felon’s 
participation in criminal activity as its basis for withholding the right to vote” 
and deems them just as worthy of the franchise as others, but for their ability 
to pay their financial obligations.283  Some courts feel that Harper is not 
applicable to LFO disenfranchisement, as the Harper Court applied strict 
scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, due to the fundamental nature of 
the voting right at issue.  The Supreme Court’s analogous rational basis 
cases, however, lend further support to the notion that Harper provides a per 
se constitutional ban on conditioning the franchise on payment of a fee.284 
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A third commonly asserted state interest is ensuring that felons 
complete the terms of their sentence.  The Supreme Court has ruled, 
however, that states may not put into place “unreasoned distinctions”285 in 
pursuing this interest once they have established the means for doing so.  
Additionally, according to Griffin v. Illinois,286 states may not 
“discriminate[] against some convicted [felons] on account of their 
poverty.”287  In Williams v. Illinois,288 for example, the Court ostensibly used 
rational basis review in ruling that states cannot extend an individual’s prison 
term based on their inability to pay a fine.289  So too with LFO 
disenfranchisement; the state is extending a felon’s period of 
disenfranchisement solely because of the involuntary nonpayment of 
financial obligations.  It is plainly “not rational to achieve” a legitimate or 
substantial state interest “in a manner that discriminates against particular 
felons on the basis of their wealth.”290 
Lastly, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez291 is 
commonly cited by courts in holding that these LFO requirements pass 
constitutional muster, as the Supreme Court explicitly held that wealth is not 
a suspect class.  The Court, however, stated that Williams is controlling when 
individuals, because of their indigency, “are completely unable to pay for 
some desired benefit” and “as a consequence, they sustain[] an absolute 
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”292  The Court 
has limited Griffin to cases in which the government has “a legal or a 
practical monopoly” over the benefit sought.293  Individuals who are 
disenfranchised due to an inability to pay their LFOs clearly fall within this 
category. 
Rational basis, although a deferential standard, should be applied “with 
bite” in cases where individual rights are at stake.294  Although courts are 
hesitant to strike down these LFO repayment laws due to the ability of the 
legislative process to curtail any perceived wrongs, as Justice Marshall noted 
in his Richardson dissent, those with felony convictions are a politically 
unpopular group, meaning if the courts do not step in to protect their rights 
under the constitution, “it is unlikely that anyone else will carry the banner 
for them.”295  Once states open the door for felons to regain their franchise 
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rights, they must do so in ways that do not discriminate on the basis of 
wealth.  To do otherwise is not consistent with Harper or the court’s larger 
equal protection jurisprudence. 
Conclusion 
The Framers, with all their many faults, fundamentally changed the 
world with their vision of a constitutional republic where “the electors are to 
be the great body of the people of the United States,” “[n]ot the rich, more 
than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant.”296  Alexis de 
Tocqueville once lauded the spirit of the American republic as a society 
characterized by a “general equality of condition” across the country.297  The 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections cemented the American people’s 
attempt to enshrine that principle into a superprecedent in our constitutional 
fabric. 
When a person is released from prison, common wisdom suggests that 
they have paid their debt to society.  The current practice of 
disenfranchisement over unpaid legal financial obligations, however, means 
that individuals are often locked in a cycle of debt where they perpetually 
pay for their crimes by exchanging their right to participate in our 
democracy.  The post-bellum roots of this practice, like the poll tax before 
it, suggest that LFO disenfranchisement, and felon disenfranchisement more 
broadly, are an attempt to further race and wealth discrimination at the ballot 
box and centralize white supremacy in American society.  This system of 
disenfranchisement silences the political voices of vulnerable people, and 
has the potential to drastically affect the upcoming elections in 2020 and 
beyond.  It is crucial then that courts, legislatures, and the American people 
work to realize the inherent principle of equality in American society that 
DeToqueville so admired, and which the New Deal and Civil Rights eras 
helped to cement in our national consciousness.  We must not hesitate to call 
the practice of LFO disenfranchisement what it is—an unconstitutional 
twenty-first century poll tax. 
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